Intuitionistic sentential logic is shown to be sound and complete with respect to a semantics centered around extensions of atomic bases (i.e. sets of inference rules for atomic sentences). The result is made possible through a non-standard interpretation of disjunction, whereby, roughly speaking, a disjunction is taken to hold just in case every atomic sentence that follows from each of the disjuncts separately holds; it is argued that this interpretation makes good sense provided that rules in atomic bases are conceived of as being accepted hypothetically rather than categorically.
Introduction
By a base-extension semantics we shall understand a semantic theory answering to the following description. As its central semantic notion the theory takes a concept of assertability, or more generally, inferability, relative to a primitively given collection of inference rules pertaining to the logic-free fragment of the language. Such a collection will be called a base (some authors prefer the term 'basis'), and the sentences capable of figuring in it-sentences free of any logical vocabulary-will be referred to as basic. (We avoid the conventional term 'atomic' since we shall wish to count the indivisible sentence ⊥ as a piece of logical vocabulary.) Unlike the inference rules typically encountered in systems of logical deduction, which prescribe whole classes of inferences instantiating certain structural patterns, the rules in a base pertain to individual sentences; thus, for example, a rule might stipulate, of three specific basic sentences a, b and c, that given a and b inference to c is permitted.
Given a base of this sort, the resulting deducibility relation among basic sentences is then extended, by means of a collection of semantic clauses, one for each logical operator, to a consequence relation over the entire language. Crucially, hypothetical judgements-as codified in sequents or conditionals-are evaluated by reference to possible extensions of the base in question; intuitively speaking, hypothetical inference from ϕ to ψ, or outright assertion of the conditional ϕ ⊃ ψ, is legitimate just in case, given what you accept at present, every possible advance placing you in a position to assert ϕ would also render ψ assertable. Just which inferences pass muster in this way will depend on the base-but some make the cut on every base, and this is taken to be the criterion of validity.
The outline just drawn leaves room for variation in at least two regards. First, rules for basic sentences may take a variety of forms, and what sorts of rules are allowed in bases may make a difference to the extension of the resulting validity concept. Thus, for instance, in [6] the present author considered a setting in which basic rules are assumed always to take the form of production rules-i.e. licences to infer a particular sentence b from a finite collection of premisses a 1 ,...,a n while leaving the set of background assumptions unchanged-and found the ensuing semantics to validate classical logic. A much more general framework is that studied by Schroeder-Heister in [8] , where, in effect, a rule is inductively characterized as any structure of the form A ⇒b, where A is a finite (possibly empty) set of rules. For a language in which ⊃ is the only logical operator, these arbitrarily deeply nested rules give rise, as explained in [9] , to a validity concept coextensive with deducibility in the intuitionistic (or, equivalently, the minimal) implicational calculus.
In the present article, we shall adopt a rule concept of intermediate generality: a basic rule licences you to infer a particular basic sentence b from a particular collection a 1 ,...,a n of basic sentences, and may additionally allow you to discharge some of the hypotheses, also basic sentences, from which the a i have been derived. As we shall see, here too the ensuing consequence relation for conditional constructions turns out to be that of intuitionistic logic.
The second area in which the general notion of a base-extension semantics leaves room for variation is in the formulations of the semantic clauses for logical operators. De Campos Sanz and Piecha [1] studied a system in which conditionals are evaluated along the lines indicated above, and disjunctions are given a standard intuitionistic interpretation so that ϕ ∨ψ holds good on a base just in case at least one of ϕ and ψ does. On this interpretation, even when bases are allowed to contain rules that discharge assumptions, the resulting consequence relation turns out to render valid a restricted form of the intuitionistically underivable Mints rule:
, where p, q, and r are any basic sentences. As we shall find, this inference loses its validity when disjunctions are given an alternative interpretation loosely based on the standard elimination rule for this operator.
More precisely, in this article, we shall be studying a base-extension semantics for a language possessing the binary sentential operators ⊃, ∧, and ∨ and the nullary operator ⊥. Bases will be allowed to contain rules capable of discharging hypotheses; ⊃ and ∧ will be given traditional interpretations, and ⊥ will be treated, in effect, as the conjunction of all basic sentences (a device familiar, inter alia, from Dummett [2] ). Less standardly, a disjunction ϕ ∨ψ will be taken to hold good just in case every sentence of the form (ϕ ⊃ p)∧(ψ ⊃ p) ⊃ p in which p is a basic sentence holds good (though the semantic clause will be formulated in a way that does not involve the conditional or conjunctive connectives). Our principal finding will be that the resulting notion of validity coincides with intuitionistic sentential logic.
Our treatment of disjunction is not without precedent: so, for instance, Prawitz [5] suggests defining ϕ ∨ψ in a second-order intuitionistic context as ∀X ((ϕ ⊃ X )∧(ψ ⊃ X ) ⊃ X ); and Ferreira [3] has demonstrated that the definition yields an inferentially adequate notion of disjunction even with a comprehension principle restricted to basic sentences.
Derivability in a base
We assume a language containing ⊥ and a denumerably infinite collection of basic sentences, and closed under the binary sentential connectives ⊃, ∧, and ∨. Lower-case italic letters will be used to refer to basic sentences, upper-case italics to finite sets thereof. For sentences in general we shall use lower-case Greek letters, and for finite sets of sentences, upper-case Greek letters. The usual conventions for suppressing set-theoretic notation will be observed, so that, in the context of symbols such as ' ' or ' ', 'P,Q' means 'P ∪Q', ' ,ψ' means ' ∪{ψ}', etc.
By a basic rule we shall mean an ordered pair Q,r , where r is a basic sentence and Q a finite (possibly empty) set of pairs of the form P,q , where q is a basic sentence and P a (possibly empty) set of basic sentences. When referring to basic rules, we shall write '(P 1 ⇒q 1 ),...,(P n ⇒q n )⇒r' for ' { P 1 ,q 1 ,..., P n ,q n },r '. Intuitively, the rule is to be read: Given derivations of q 1 through q n , to infer r, discharging from the derivations in question premiss sets P 1 through P n , respectively. A base is a set of basic rules.
Officially, given a base B, the relation B of derivability in B of a basic sentence from a finite set of basic sentences is inductively generated by the following two clauses: ⇒q 1 ) ,...,(P n ⇒q n )⇒r) ∈ B and S,P 1 B q 1 and … and S,P n B q n then S B r.
That is to say, only as required by (Ref) and (App) does the relation B obtain between any objects.
The relations B will form the foundation of our semantics. Before proceeding to the latter, let us record two properties of derivability in bases. and by the inductive definition of B this suffices to prove the lemma.
PROOF. Left-to-right. Assume that T B u, and moreover that C ⊇ B and C t for every t ∈ T ; we seek to prove that C u. First, observe that (i) (P ∪{q})−T C q for every P and q. For either q ∈ T , in which case by hypothesis C q, whence (i) follows by Lemma 2.1; or q ∈ T , in which case (i) is just an instance of (Ref). Also, for any n, P 1 , …, P n , q 1 , …, q n , r,
(ii) if ((P 1 ⇒q 1 ),...,(P n ⇒q n )⇒r) ∈ B and (S ∪P 1 )−T C q 1 and … and (S ∪P n )−T C q n then S −T C r.
For whenever 1 i n the hypothesis that (S ∪P i )−T C q i implies by Lemma 2.1 that
By the inductive definition of B , (i) and (ii) jointly imply that P −T C q whenever P B q. In particular, therefore, C u since T B u.
Right-to-left. Assume that C u for every C ⊇ B such that C t for every t ∈ T . Then, in particular B T u, where B T = B ∪{⇒t | t ∈ T }. Now by (Ref) it holds of every P and q that
Also, for any n, P 1 , …, P n , q 1 , …, q n , r, (iv) if ((P 1 ⇒q 1 ),...,(P n ⇒q n )⇒r) ∈ B T and T ,S,P 1 B q 1 and … and T ,S,P n B q n then T ,S B r;
for either (P 1 ⇒q 1 ),...,(P n ⇒q n )⇒r is a member of B, in which case T ,S B r in virtue of (App), or it is of the form ⇒t with t ∈ T , in which case T ,S B r, i.e. T ,S B t, in virtue of (Ref) .
By definition of B T , (iii) and (iv) jointly imply that T ,P B q whenever P B T q; so in particular
In the interest of conceptual economy, the relation of derivability in a base has been defined here in a direct, inductive fashion. Equivalently, and perhaps more familiarly, a basic rule (P 1 ⇒ q 1 ),...,(P n ⇒q n )⇒r may be represented in natural-deduction notation as
B , on this conception, is just the relation of deducibility in the system of natural deduction consisting of just the rules in B, where q counts as deducible from P if there exists a deduction whose conclusion is q and all of whose undischarged premisses are members of P. From this perspective, Lemmas 2.1 and 2.2 are intuitively obvious. Left-to-right of 2.2: given a deduction of u from T and proofs (i.e. deductions from ∅) of all members of T , stack the latter on top of the former to obtain a proof of u. Right-to-left: given a proof of u in B ∪{⇒t | t ∈ T }, replace every application of a ⇒t-rule with an occurrence of the t in question as a premiss, and the result is a derivation in B of u from T .
Why, from a conceptual point of view, might one wish to consider basic rules that allow for the discharging of hypotheses? Well, the practice of assuming and discharging hypotheses is certainly an integral part of ordinary deductive reasoning, and there is no immediately obvious reason why such operations should need to be restricted to arguments involving logically compound sentences. Indeed, examples may be found in natural language of syntactically atomic predicates conceptually related in such a way as to call for hypothesis-discharging modes of inference: if I accept that Sandy is a sibling of Mary, then I am committed to accepting anything that follows both from the hypothesis that Sandy is a brother of Mary and from the hypothesis that Sandy is a sister of Mary. In the rule notation adopted here, I am conceptually obliged, for any sentence p, to reason in accordance with the rule (⇒'Sandy is a sibling of Mary'), ('Sandy is a brother of Mary'⇒p), ('Sandy is a sister of Mary'⇒p) ⇒p.
On the other hand, it might be argued that the adoption of rules of this form-in which not only individual basic sentences, but also inferential compounds of basic sentences, figure as premisses of inferences-amounts in effect to importing a logical apparatus into the vocabulary of bases, hereby undermining the very idea of a base as a logic-free foundation for an inferential system. (Critical discussions along these lines may be found in [4] and [7] .) No attempt will be made to settle the issue here; in the estimation of this author, hypothesis-discharging bases are at any rate sufficiently intuitively appealing to warrant the sort of investigation undertaken in the present article.
Semantics and intuitionistic derivability
We are now in a position to specify of our semantics. For any base B, a relation B between finite sets of sentences and individual sentences is determined recursively as follows:
That the recursion is well founded is perhaps not immediately apparent. But define the degree of a basic sentence as 1, that of ⊥ as 2, and that of ϕ ⊃ψ, ϕ ∧ψ, or ϕ ∨ψ as the sum of the degrees of ϕ and ψ, plus 1; then in each of the definitional clauses the sum of the degrees of the formulas flanking ' ' in the definiendum exceeds the corresponding number for any occurrence of ' ' in the definiens. B , thus defined, makes for a conservative extension of B to the full language:
PROOF. By (At) if T is empty; by (Inf), (At), and Lemma 2.2 otherwise.
The following basic properties of our semantic relation will prove useful. When B ϕ we shall say that B supports ϕ. If every base supporting all members of supports ϕ we shall write " ϕ" and call the inference from to ϕ valid; an individual sentence ϕ is called valid if ϕ. By Lemma 3.2 (b) we see that ϕ just in case ∅ ϕ. The principal result of the present article is that the notion of validity just defined is coextensive with the standard relation of sentential intuitionistic derivability. Our official inductive definition of the latter runs as follows. Only as required by these eight rules does the relation obtain between any objects. They are, of course, just the standard rules of sentential intuitionistic natural deduction, recast so as to allow us to do away with derivations as a class of objects.
Soundness
PROOF. We begin by observing that, by the definition of (or, if you prefer, by Lemma 3.2 (c) and the equivalence of and ∅ ), is transitive in the sense that if ϕ for every ϕ ∈ , and moreover ψ, then ψ. Now to establish our theorem, by the inductive definition of it is sufficient to prove the following.
The proofs in most cases are quite straightforward; (∨E) , however, requires a somewhat more involved argument, wherefore we save it for last. (R) holds a fortiori by definition of the validity relation (p. 5).
(⊃I) . Assume that ,ϕ ψ. To show that ϕ ⊃ψ, assume that B ϑ for every ϑ ∈ . Then, by Lemma 3.2(a), C ψ whenever C ⊇ B and C ϕ, which is to say that ϕ B ψ, i.e. that B ϕ ⊃ψ. (∧E) . By (∧), B ϕ and B ψ whenever B ϕ ∧ψ; hence ϕ ∧ψ ϕ and ϕ ∧ψ ψ, whence (∧E) follows.
(∨I) . It is required to show, first, that ϕ ∨ψ whenever ϕ, and, second, that ϕ ∨ψ whenever ψ. Since the arguments are similar, we prove only the former; for this purpose, by transitivity of , it suffices to establish that ϕ ϕ ∨ψ. Suppose, therefore, that B ϕ; we wish to establish that B ϕ ∨ψ. To this end, consider any p and any C ⊇ B such that ϕ C p and ψ C p; it is required to show that C p. From the hypothesis that B ϕ it follows by Lemma 3.2(a) that C ϕ; since moreover ϕ C p it follows by 3. In proving ( * ) we assume as induction hypothesis that ( * ) holds good with any base in place of B and any strict subsentence of χ in place of χ . There are five cases to consider according to the main connective (if any) of χ .
Case 1: χ = p, a basic sentence. Then ( * ) is immediate by (∨). From the first hypothesis of (∨E) it follows that B ϕ ∨ψ. From the second we may infer that ϕ B χ, for any C ⊇ B such that C ϕ will also be such that C ϑ for every ϑ ∈ . By the third hypothesis, similarly, ψ B χ ; and thus B χ by ( * ). This establishes (∨) and therewith Theorem 4.1.
Completeness
So all intuitionistically derivable inferences qualify as valid. It remains to prove the converse implication: with respect to our semantics, intuitionistic logic is complete. The mathematical resources required for the purpose are quite elementary; there will be no need to invoke canonical models, König's lemma, or even bar induction. The proof proceeds, instead, by 'simulating' an intuitionistic deduction by means of basic sentences in a base tailor-made, in every instance, for the particular inference at hand. To illustrate the main idea, suppose that ζ , and that a member of contains as a subformula the conjunction p∧q. Corresponding to the natural-deduction rules allowing inference from p and q to p∧q, from p∧q to p, and from p∧q to q, the specially tailored base N will contain, for a basic sentence r arbitrarily selected to represent p∧q, the rules (⇒p),(⇒q)⇒r and (⇒r)⇒p and (⇒r)⇒q. (For the scheme to work as intended, r must be selected from outside and ζ ; the availability of such an r is guaranteed by our stipulation that the language's supply of basic sentences be infinite.) Once every formula γ occurring in or ζ has been furnished in similar fashion with a basic counterpart γ , we will establish that each such γ is indeed equivalent to its own counterpart in the sense that γ N γ and γ N γ . Since by hypothesis ζ , it will follow that N ζ (where is the set of basic counterparts of members of ), whence N ζ , whence ζ since every rule in N corresponds to an instance of an intuitionistic natural-deduction rule.
Here are the details.
PROOF. Assume that ζ . Let be the set containing all members of ∪{ζ } and their subsentences. With every non-basic γ ∈ associate a basic sentence γ ∈ in such a way that γ 1 = γ 2 whenever γ 1 = γ 2 . Also, for every basic g ∈ , set g = g. (Apart from these conditions, the exact nature of the mapping is immaterial.) Conversely, with every basic p associate a sentence p in such a way that (γ ) = γ for every γ (basic or not) in ; when p is not in the range of , set p = p. (Thus is an extension of the inverse of , defined for all basic sentences.) For any and P, write ={ϕ | ϕ ∈ } and P ={p | p ∈ P}. Our strategy will be to construct a base N mimicking the rules of natural deduction by way of in such a way that ( †) for every γ ∈ and every B ⊇ N , B γ iff B γ ; and ( ‡) for any P and q whatever, if P N q then P q . These properties of N will yield our desired conclusion in the following way: First, from our hypothesis that ζ it follows that N ζ -for if B ⊇ N and B ξ for every ξ ∈ then by ( †) B ξ for every ξ ∈ , whence B ζ since ζ , whence B ζ by ( †) again. But then by Theorem 3.1 N ζ , whence by ( ‡) ( ) (ζ ) , which is just to say that ζ , as desired. N is defined as the base containing all and only rules of the following forms.
As our first step towards establishing ( †), we show that, for any B ⊇ N and any conditional ϕ ⊃ψ ∈ ,
Left-to-right: if B (ϕ ⊃ψ) , then ϕ B (ϕ ⊃ψ) by Lemma 2.1; also ϕ B ϕ ; hence ϕ B ψ by application of the relevant rule of form (2) . Right-to-left holds immediately by application of the relevant rule of form (1) .
Next, for every B ⊇ N and every conjunction ϕ ∧ψ ∈ ,
(ii) B (ϕ ∧ψ) iff B ϕ and B ψ .
This holds by the relevant rules of forms (3), (4) and (5). Left-to-right holds by rule form (9), and right-to-left since ⊥ is basic. Now Theorem 3.1 applied to (i) through (iv) yields, for any B ⊇ N ,
iff, for every basic p and every C ⊇ B, if ϕ C p and ψ C p, then C p; and (viii) B ⊥ iff B p for every basic p -always providing that the relevant sentences belong to so that is defined.
( †) may now be established by induction on the structure of γ . For basic γ ∈ , ( †) holds trivially since γ = γ ; for γ =⊥ (provided ⊥∈ ) the equivalence follows immediately from (viii). Now, for the induction step, let it hold of every B ⊇ N that B ϕ iff B ϕ, and B ψ iff B ψ; our job is to show that the corresponding equivalences hold for (ϕ ⊃ψ) , (ϕ ∧ψ) , and (ϕ ∨ψ) . We begin by inferring from our induction hypothesis that, for any D ⊇ N , ϕ and ϕ are interchangeable with respect to D in the sense that, whatever formula ϑ may be,
and likewise
Now, recalling (v) and drawing on the above equivalences, we see that 
This concludes the induction establishing ( †).
It remains to prove ( ‡). Informally speaking, ( ‡) holds because every rule of N corresponds to a standard introduction or elimination rule for some sentential operator, so that any basic derivation in N 'translates' directly into a derivation of intuitionistic natural deduction. More rigorously put, by the inductive definition of N , ( ‡) will be proved if it can be established in general that S ,p p and if ( (P 1 ⇒q 1 ) ,...,(P n ⇒q n )⇒r) ∈ N and S ,P 1 q 1 and … and S ,P n q n then S r .
The former of these statements is just an instance of (R). The latter, spelled out in accordance with our characterization of N , amounts to the conjunction of the following claims (in each case subject to the proviso that all applications of be defined):
And since (γ ) = γ whenever γ is defined, the above claims hold good in virtue of (⊃I) through (⊥E). Thus, ( ‡) holds as claimed.
Mints's rule and disjunction
As related in the introductory section, the adoption in [1] of a semantic clause for disjunction along standard intuitionistic lines-in our notation, B ϕ ∨ψ iff B ϕ or B ψ-was found to lead to a consequence relation incorporating the intuitionistically invalid atomic Mints rule. In this article, by contrast, a not-so-standard disjunction clause has given us intuitionistic logic, and just that. To get a better grip on what is going on here, let us investigate just why the atomic Mints rule holds good on the more conventional semantics, and at what point the argument breaks down if (∨) is used instead. In fact, let us consider a slightly more general inference figure, namely, from (a⊃b)⊃(c∨d) to ((a⊃b)⊃c)∨((a⊃b)⊃d). The Mints rule results if c is required to coincide with a; but this restriction makes no difference to the argument.
Regardless of our choice of semantics for disjunction, the following claims are easily shown, as one would expect, to hold good in general:
(ii) if ( (P 1 ⇒q 1 ) ,...,(P n ⇒q n )⇒r) ∈ B and a⊃b,S,P 1 B q 1 and … and a⊃b,S,P n B q n , then a⊃b,S B r. ⇒q 1 ) ,...,(P n ⇒q n )⇒r) ∈ C and a⊃b,S,P 1 B q 1 and … and a⊃b,S,P n B q n , then a⊃b,S B r.
By (i), (iv) and induction according to the definition of C , it holds of any P, q that
(v) holds good on either interpretation of disjunction. So does the claim that any base containing (⇒a)⇒b will support the sentence a⊃b; in particular C a⊃b, whence C c∨d since by hypothesis B (a⊃b)⊃(c∨d). At this point, however, the two interpretations part ways. According to the conventional clause for disjunction it now follows that either C c or C d, i.e. either C c or C d, whence by (v) a⊃b B c or a⊃b B d, whence B ((a⊃b)⊃c)∨((a⊃b)⊃d); but given (∨) instead this final chain of inference will not be available to us.
The proof given in [1] differs from ours in its details, but (apart from the above-mentioned identification of a and c) the overall line of argument is the same:
. It is not hard to see that the argument straightforwardly generalizes, from the conditional a⊃b of basic sentences considered here, to any sentence that can be similarly captured in a single basic rule; in other words, to any sentence of the form (p 11 ∧···∧p 1m 1 ⊃q 1 )∧···∧(p n1 ∧···∧p nm n ⊃q n )⊃r (where, if k = 0, ϕ 1 ∧···∧ϕ k ⊃ψ is taken simply to be ψ). Indeed, any conjunction π = 1 ∧···∧ l of such basic-rule sentences can be handled in this way: just extend B with a set of rules, one for each i , and proceed as before to establish that π ⊃(c∨d) (π ⊃c)∨(π ⊃d).
Completeness results aside, from a conceptual point of view, does our (∨) have anything to recommend it, considered as an account of the meaning of the disjunction operator? Put differently: in the context of base-extension semantics, is there any intuitive reason to reject the idea that a disjunction holds good on a base just in case one of its disjuncts does? The answer depends, perhaps, on how we conceive of bases and their extensions.
One way of thinking about a base is as a set of categorically accepted rules. At a given moment t, for a given speaker S of the language, there is such a thing as the set of basic inference rules accepted, at that moment, by that speaker, as being good, or truth-preserving, or something of that sort. A rule (⇒a)⇒b is, of course, an object of an intrinsically hypothetical nature-given a, to infer b-but the speaker's acceptance of it is categorical: the rule is genuinely held to be a good one. To say that B ϕ, on this conception, is to say that any speaker accepting all rules of B in this categorical way is committed to accepting ϕ categorically as well. When evaluating a conditional ϕ ⊃ψ, the speaker considers possible situations in which, in addition to the things he/she actually believes, he/she would consider ϕ categorically assertable, and asks himself/herself whether in such situations ψ invariably comes out assertable as well; if the answer is yes, the conditional is accepted. From this point of view, given an intuitionistic outlook and a sufficiently strict notion of categorical acceptance, it seems not unreasonable to demand that a disjunction be accepted only if at least one of the disjuncts is.
But now let us agree for a while to think of basic rules instead as potential objects of hypothetical acceptance. Thus, a cognitive agent may not actually think that b follows from a, but might undertake, for the sake of argument, to treat b as immediately inferable from a-i.e. to adopt the basic rule (⇒a)⇒b-to see what can be concluded on such a principle. The statement ' B ϕ' is now to be given a reading along the lines that insofar as the rules in B are adopted, a speaker is committed to accepting ϕ; hypothetical acceptance of the rules in B mandates similarly hypothetical acceptance of ϕ. And to say that B ϕ ⊃ψ is to say that anyone who hypothetically accepts the rules in B, and moreover is committed to hypothetically accepting ϕ, will be similarly committed to ψ.
The difference between the two points of view may be brought out intuitively by considering a statement ϕ of the form I categorically accept that ϕ . Given a certain amount of introspective ability, the conditions for categorical acceptance of ϕ will be the same as those for categorical acceptance of ϕ itself. But to accept ϕ hypothetically is not ipso facto to accept ϕ hypothetically, and the commitments incurred by accepting the one may well differ from those brought on by accepting the other. For instance, let ϕ be the sentence: 'The number of pebbles in this sack is even. ' The following makes good sense:
Assume hypothetically that the number of pebbles in this sack is even. If that is so, then nevertheless I shall never come to accept categorically that the number is even, for I can't be bothered to count them.
But change the hypothesis from ϕ to ϕ : Assume hypothetically that I accept categorically that the number of pebbles in this sack is even. If that is so, then nevertheless I shall never come to accept categorically that the number is even, for I can't be bothered to count them. This, by contrast, is absurd. Moral: two sentences may well diverge with regard to hypothetical acceptance despite coinciding with regard to categorical acceptance; and so, from a conceptual point of view, it makes a difference whether, when we say that ϕ ⊃ψ is to be accepted just in case commitment to accepting ψ invariably accompanies commitment to accepting ϕ, what we have in mind is categorical acceptance, as on the first of the accounts outlined above, or hypothetical, as on the second.
Returning, now, to disjunction: if B is taken to signify hypothetical acceptance on the basis of B, is it intuitively reasonable to require that B ϕ or B ψ whenever B ϕ ∨ψ? In the view of this author, no: one may perfectly well take it as hypothetically given that at least one of ϕ and ψ holds good without committing oneself specifically to the one or the other. What must be acknowledged in such a state is merely that whatever follows from ϕ as well as from ψ must be accepted outright-albeit, as always, conditionally on whatever basic rules have been adopted. And this, of course, is just the idea underlying our clause (∨).
The foregoing is not meant as an argument that the traditional notion of disjunction has no place in base-extension semantics; only that (∨), despite its somewhat involved nature, can hold its own as an intuitively justifiable alternative.
